Court Dismisses Challenge to Mineral Rights Ownership

The Supreme Court of Ohio today dismissed a dispute over oil and gas rights underlying property in rural Belmont County, letting a lower court ruling stand.

The Supreme Court ruled it had improvidently accepted Darrell Crozier et al. v. Pipe Creek Conservancy LLC et al., a case it heard in February. The Court majority issued an entry without an opinion, keeping in place the ruling of the Seventh District Court of Appeals.

Justice Patrick F. Fischer wrote a concurring opinion, stating the Court correctly dismissed the case after determining the family who brought the challenge waived their right to argue an error they claimed the Seventh District made. Justice Fischer wrote the family actually changed their argument on the issue the Supreme Court agreed to hear only after losing the case in the Seventh District.

Justices Jennifer Brunner, Joseph T. Deters, and Daniel R. Hawkins joined the entry dismissing the case.

Justices R. Patrick DeWine and Megan E. Shanahan joined Justice Fischer’s opinion.

Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy dissented without a written opinion.

Supreme Court Agreed To Examine Law Governing Mineral Rights
The heirs of Paul and Estella Crozier maintained they owned the mineral rights to 136 acres of property sold in 1935 in Belmont County’s Mead Township. Two current owners of some of the surface property, Pipe Creek Conservancy and Melissa Karkowski, argued that under the Ohio Marketable Title Act, the Crozier family rights had been extinguished, and they own the mineral rights.

A Belmont County trial court sided with the Croziers in the dispute. Pipe Creek and Karkowski appealed the decision to the Seventh District, which sided with them.

Darrell Crozier and other family members raised three issues in the appeal to the Supreme Court. Two concerned the Seventh District’s interpretation of the language of a 1949 deed. A third claim asserted the Seventh District improperly interpreted how the Marketable Title Act operates. The Supreme Court only agreed to consider one argument, known as a proposition of law, which dealt with which title transaction should be regarded as the “root of title” under a provision of the Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47(E).

Lower Courts Evaluate Deeds To Determine Mineral Rights
In 1935, Paul and Estella Crozier sold property to Mont and Melissa Cook. In all deeds, the sellers wrote, “EXCEPTED AND RESERVED, all of the oil & gas rights and privileges on and underlying the above described tract of land.” Paul died, followed by Estella. In 1996, Darrell Crozier probated Estella’s will in Belmont County Probate Court. The will documented that she conveyed to her heirs all of her oil and gas rights underlying 136 acres of surface property.

In 2017, Darrell Crozier and the other Estella Crozier heirs filed an action in Belmont County Common Pleas Court for a declaratory judgment, stating they held the title to the oil and gas rights that were reserved when the Croziers sold the land to the Cooks in 1935. Pipe Creek and Karkowski now own the surface right to some of that land. Pipe Creek and Karkowski objected to Crozier’s claim. The trial court had to determine the “root of title” for each property owner and then consider if any action taken by the Croziers retained their mineral rights under the Marketable Title Act.

While the surface property ownership changed hands several times before Pipe Creek and Karkowski owned it, the trial court determined a 1974 deed served as the “root of title,” which is defined in R.C. 5301.47(E), for Pipe Creek’s land. A 1973 deed was the root of title for Karkowski. Those deeds do not mention the Croziers’ oil and gas reservation. The trial court next had to examine if any action was taken in the 40 years following the establishment of those deeds that would act as a “savings event” that retained the Croziers’ rights. The trial court found the 1996 will, which was recorded in Belmont County, was a savings event. The court ruled the Croziers preserved their mineral rights.

Pipe Creek and Karkowski argued an older deed from 1949 was the root of title and that one should be examined. A savings event would have had to occur within 40 years of 1949 to preserve the Croziers’ rights. Since recording of Estella’s will happened in 1996, it occurred after the 1989 deadline and didn’t qualify as a savings event that could maintain the Croziers’ mineral rights, the surface property owners argued.

The Seventh District agreed that the 1949 deed was the root of title. The appeals court also ruled the wording of the deed was not specific enough to preserve the mineral rights. It reversed the trial court’s order granting the Crozier heirs the mineral rights and found Pipe Creek and Karkowski were the owners.

Family Changes Legal Arguments, Concurrence Noted
In his concurring opinion, Justice Fisher noted when the case was in the trial court, the Crozier heirs requested summary judgment in their favor. In their motion, the family argued the 1949, not the 1973 and 1974, deeds were the root of title. They also argued the language of those deeds was specific enough to maintain the mineral rights, and those rights existed in 2017 when they filed for a declaratory judgment.

Justice Fischer wrote that even after the trial court ruled in their favor based on the 1973 and 1974 deeds, the Croziers continued to argue in legal documents that the 1949 deed was the proper root of title.

When the matter reached the Seventh District, the surface property owners argued that because the 1996 will identified the Crozier heirs’ mineral rights, the trial court was required, but failed, to examine the next preceding deed to determine whether there were 40 years where no preservation of mineral rights was documented.

Justice Fischer wrote that instead of defending the trial court’s decision, the Croziers agreed with the surface owners that the 1949 deed was the correct deed to examine. “Without much analysis,” the Seventh District determined the 1949 deed was the root of title, the concurrence stated.

Only when the Seventh District ruled the language of the 1949 deed was insufficient to preserve the Crozier heirs’ interest did the Crozier heirs argue that the root of title was the 1970s deeds.

“In other words, what the Crozier heirs really take issue with is the Seventh District’s holding about what constitutes a general versus specific reference in a deed – an issue that was not accepted for review by this court,” Justice Fischer wrote.

By not arguing for the use of the 1970s deeds in the lower courts, the Crozier heirs waived their right to make the argument before the Supreme Court, and the case was improvidently accepted, the concurrence concluded.

2024-0034. Crozier v. Pipe Creek Conservancy LLC, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-1291.

View oral argument video of this case.

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